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Abstract
This paper explores the limits of “verifiability” induced by the process of
costly evidence production in contractual relationships of complete information.
I study how the cost of providing evidence (disclosing documents) influences the
set of enforceable contracts. I show that evidence cost can be both beneficial
and detrimental with regard to enlarging the set of settlement outcomes that
can be implemented. Further, I study how what can be considered verifiable
is influenced by parties’ incentives to produce evidence and by the particular
evidence cost structure. My analysis includes the opportunity for contracting
parties to renegotiate (or settle) prior to the enforcement phase. I also study
how the availability of redundant documents expands the set of enforceable
contracts, and discuss the relevance of my findings to the design of legal institutions.
JEL Classification: C70, D74, K10.

In this paper, I present a game theoretic model to show how verifiability — that a
court can observe a given aspect of a contractual relationship — depends on evidence
production costs. In practice, courts do not simply observe a given aspect of a
contractual relationship. Instead, court action depends upon the actual evidence that
is presented to the court by the contracting parties, and this evidence production is
costly. Thus, verifiability depends on both the cost of producing evidence and on the
parties’ incentives to produce evidence.
This paper builds from the analysis of Bull and Watson (2004), who provide a
foundation for verifiability by explicitly modeling evidence disclosure and contract
enforcement in contractual relationships of complete information. There, evidence is
costless to disclose when it is available, and simply cannot be disclosed when it is not
∗
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available. They treat evidence cost as binary in that presenting evidence has a cost of
zero when it is available, and an infinite amount when it is not available. However, in
practice, there may be a moderate cost associated with disclosing available evidence.
For example, it may be costly to locate available documents in one’s files, to transport
physical objects to the external enforcer, or to present documents or testimony. This
paper’s key departure from that analysis is that here evidence production is costly in
a moderate sense.1
Here, players interact over five periods of time. They first agree to a contract. In
the second period, they engage in productive interaction. They have the opportunity
to renegotiate the original contract in the third period. Renegotiation can be viewed
as pretrial settlement. Players simultaneously produce costly evidence in the fourth
period, and, in the fifth period, the court imposes transfers on the basis of evidence
presented. As the enforcement phase (the fourth and fifth periods) typically involves
the costly production of evidence, settlement is jointly beneficial to the players. The
surplus of this renegotiation is the evidence production costs that would be incurred
if external enforcement were to occur with the original contract in place.2 It is the
outcome of settlement, which depends upon the actual productive outcome that is
realized, that shapes players’ incentives during the productive phase of interaction.
Thus, my analysis focuses on the settlement outcomes that can be implemented.
One important result from this model is that evidence cost can be both beneficial
and detrimental with regard to enlarging the set of settlement outcomes that can be
implemented. Clearly, if two different states are to have different settlement outcomes,
then at least one player must have the incentive to produce different evidence in one
state than in the other. This implies a different evidence production cost in one
state than in the other. However, when the players renegotiate, this cost difference
is divided between them. So depending upon the particular cost, it may be possible
that either more or less can be implemented than in the costless setting. My main
technical result is to characterize the implementable settlement outcomes. I show
that the set of enforceable contracts is sensitive to both the manner by which states
can be distinguished from each other and the cost of doing so.
One feature of the evidence environment that has implications for institutions are,
what I call, redundant documents. Two documents are redundant if they are available
in exactly the same contingencies. I show that redundant documents are quite useful
in that they provide the flexibility to tailor the cost of equilibrium evidence production
to fit the desired outcome of settlement.3 Further, the study of redundant documents
forms the basis for my analysis of two legal rules. The first rule deals with the
1

Another difference is that I restrict attention to contracts between two parties, while the analysis
of Bull and Watson (2004) applies to n-player settings.
2
This is because players can avoid the cost of producing evidence by settling prior to litigation.
3
That is, though the available documents and the cost of producing them is exogenous, it is
possible to design contracts that induce different documents to be disclosed and different costs to
be incurred.
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feature of the adversarial legal system known as the “discovery” process. I show that
allowing parties to request evidence from each other expands the set of implementable
settlement outcomes by creating redundant documents. I also study a legal rule
which requires that the court not condition upon which player provided a redundant
document. This is motivated by the court ruling based upon the facts of the case. I
show that this rule reduces the set of settlement outcomes that can be implemented.
I then explore the impact of both rules being imposed and discuss ways of reducing
the impact of the second legal rule.
Since I study complete information settings, this model is, in a sense, one of
Nash implementation with renegotiation where the renegotiation takes place before
costly evidence is disclosed.4 However, it is not a standard mechanism-design model
because it specifies inalienable (and costly) evidentiary decisions and state-contingent
evidence sets. In terms of mechanism design, this model has fixed message spaces,
state-dependent constraints on what players can say, and sending messages involves a
cost (which may be state-dependent). Green and Laffont (1986) previously studied a
model of this type without moderate cost. However, the focus and results here are not
related.5 Instead, the results here rely on the nature of “public actions” in my model
in which the court only compels transfers. I discuss why this additional structure is
somewhat realistic. Evans (2006) consider costs of sending messages in a mechanism
design framework, but those costs do not depend on the state and the focus of his
analysis differs from that here. Bull (2006) presents a model of mechanism design
with moderate evidence cost in a complete information setting.
My focus is on contracting parties’ opportunities to present documented evidence,
and the cost of doing so. As such, this model differs from other models of court decision making and evidence production.6 Some more recent papers have analyzed some
4
Maskin and Moore (1999) study mechanism design with renegotiation occurring after messages
are sent. I limit attention to simultaneous disclosure of evidence.
5
See Bull and Watson (2006) for a discussion of how models of evidence (without moderately
costly evidence production) relate to Green and Laffont’s model.
6
Classic legal treatments of evidence are Bentham (1827) and Wigmore (1940). The influencecost literature studies models in which the probability of a litigant winning at trial depends upon
litigants’ effort or expenditure (typically on evidence production). Examples of this type of model
include Tullock (1980), Cooter and Rubinfeld (1989), and Bernardo, Talley, and Welch (2000).
Another area of the literature models the court as a Bayesian decision maker who receives signals,
which result from effort or expenditure in evidence production, of the defendant’s type. See for,
example, Rubinfeld and Sappington (1987). In some settings, such as Sobel (1985) and Shin (1994
and 1998), the decisionmaker is allowed to reallocate the burden of proof. Modeling the court as
a Bayesian decisionmaker may not be appropriate in all settings. See Reinganum and Daughety
(2000a). The strategic search literature treats a litigant’s production of evidence as a costly random
sample of evidence from a distribution of evidence. A litigant may draw numerous times, but is
assumed to present the most favorable evidence. Examples of this approach include Daughety and
Reinganum (2000b), Froeb and Kobayashi (2000), and Gong and McAfee (2000). An advantage of
this costly sampling approach is that it allows for the consideration of evidence costs. However, it
does not address the cost of an individual piece of evidence or the decision to search for particular
pieces of evidence.
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settings with state-dependant evidence production cost. Sanchirico (2000) models the
court’s decision as depending upon the evidence presented at trial. In his model, the
cost of producing evidence depends upon the state, and evidence can be forged (at a
greater cost). The analysis there focuses on a tort setting with two possible states,
and is geared towards providing an explanation of the English transition toward a
more passive fact-finding jury. Sanchirico and Triantis (2004) consider a contract
setting in which a single player presents different levels of evidence that are costly
to produce, and all evidence can be forged at a greater cost. They present optimal
contracts that induce evidence forgery. Deneckere and Severinov (2001) consider a
principal-agent setting where the agent communicates with the principal over multiple
periods and can send any, and only one, of his messages each period. These messages
are basically the same as the documents presented here. In one part of their analysis,
they consider a setting where the agent incurs a cost of lying, but no cost of truth
telling. In my model, evidence disclosure by the players occurs simultaneously. This
is consistent with much of the literature on evidence production, and I would suggest
is an appropriate starting point for understanding the effects of moderate evidence
production cost.7
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 1, I describe the model of costly
evidence production. In Section 2, I discuss the relationship between evidence production costs and implementable outcomes of settlement. There I specifically demonstrate how the additional feature of evidence production being costly changes the set
of implementable outcomes. I provide a characterization of implementable outcomes
in Section 3. I begin to explore implications for institutional design in Sections 4
and 5. I study the flexibility allowed by the redundancy of documents in Section 4.
Further, I discuss how contracts and evidence rules can be structured to take make
use of redundant documents. In Section 5, I explore the implications of two rules of
evidence when evidence is costly to produce. Appendix A contains proofs not found
in the text. Appendix C briefly examines the no settlement case.

1

A Model of Contract, Evidence Disclosure, External Enforcement, and Settlement

I consider a contractual relationship between two players (also called agents) who
interact over five periods of time. In the first period, the players form a contract. This
contract has an externally enforced component m which specifies monetary transfers
to be compelled by the court in period 5, conditional on evidence presented to the
court in period 4. The contract also has a self-enforced component, which specifies
the players’ individual behavior in the contractual relationship. The interaction of
players is described in Figure 1.
7

My plans for future research include analyzing dynamic mechanisms in a setting of moderately
costly evidence production. Bull (2006) is one project in that direction.
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Figure 1: Timing of Interaction.
In the second period, productive interaction occurs, leading to an outcome a which
I call the state of the relationship. The state is commonly observed by the players.
I let A denote the set of possible states and I assume A is finite. Players receive
an immediate payoff given by u : A → R2 . My analysis focuses on how the state
influences the subsequent settlement outcome.8
In the third period, the players have the opportunity to renegotiate m. At the
end of period 3 the players’ renegotiation puts m0 in place. If the players do not
renegotiate, then m0 ≡ m. Renegotiation can be interpreted as pretrial settlement.9 I
do not explicitly model the procedure by which players renegotiate. Instead I assume
that the outcome of renegotiation is given by the generalized Nash bargaining solution.
Players commonly know the state a and available documents which may be provided
in court. Thus, the outcome of external contract enforcement of the initial contract
m in court defines the disagreement point for their bargaining. I denote player i’s
bargaining weight by πi .
In period 4 the players simultaneously and independently disclose documents
which are presented to the court.10 The production of evidence is costly in two
respects. First, each document may exist in one state but not in another (infinite
cost in the latter state). Denote by Di (a) the set of documents that can be presented by player i in state a. Since not all documents may be available in all states,
S
Di (a) 6= Di (b) is typically, but not necessarily, the case. Let Di ≡ a∈A Di (a) denote
the set of documents available to player i over all states. I assume Di is finite. I also
assume D1 and D2 are disjoint sets. That is, each player’s documents are unique. I
S
S
let D ≡ D1 D2 and D(a) ≡ D1 (a) D2 (a) for each a. For any set of documents
E ⊂ D, I write Ei as those documents produced by player i. The feasible sets of
produced documents are given by D ≡ {E | E ⊂ D(a), for some a ∈ A}. Note that
the empty set (no documents disclosed) is an element of D.
The second kind of cost is a more moderate cost the players must pay as a function
of the evidence set. An example of this type of cost is that if a party is to produce
8

A detailed treatment of how the behavior later in the game influences implementable productive
actions is found in Bull and Watson (2004).
9
Of course, the surplus maximizing outcome will specify a constant m0 and no evidence will be
produced.
10
Of course, renegotiation will optimally lead to a constant transfer m0 , and no documents will
actually be disclosed.
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a canceled check, it may be necessary to locate it in her files. I denote the cost of
gathering the set of documents E to player i as γi (E), where γi : D → R+ . This
allows for player i’s evidence production cost being influenced by those documents
produced by player j. Documents represent evidence on which the court conditions
transfers.
In period 5 the court imposes the transfer m0 as a function of the documents
P
disclosed by the players.11 I assume i∈N m0i ≤ 0. Formally, m and the renegotiated
transfer m0 : D → R2 , so for any evidence set E ∈ D, m0i (E) is the monetary transfer
made to player i. Thus, player i’s total payoff in the contract game, if the players
go to court, is ui (a) + mi (E) − γi (E). Remember that m is jointly selected by the
players in period 1.
In practice courts generally cannot impose fines (which impose that a player pay
a transfer to a third party) in contract cases.12 That is, the court can only impose
transfers between litigants. This justifies restricting attention to balanced externallyenforced contracts, which are functions of the form m : D → R20 , where R20 ≡ {x ∈
P
R2 | i=1,2 xi = 0}.13
I apply the term disclosure rule to any function β : A → D, satisfying β(a) ⊂ D(a)
for each a ∈ A. This function describes how the players behave in period 4, conditional
on the state. For example, in state a the players disclose documents β(a). Let βi (a)
denote the documents presented by player i in state a. I refer to the interaction of
players in period 4 and the court imposition of transfers as an evidence production
game.
Renegotiation in period 3 leads to a state-contingent continuation value function.
This is found by working backward from the enforcement outcome with m in place.
The players can avoid the cost of evidence disclosure anticipated with β and m (in
the evidence production game) by renegotiation. This implies, given a, that players
negotiate over how to divide the joint surplus of γ1 (β(a))+γ2 (β(a)). Given state a the
generalized Nash bargaining solution implies that the state-contingent continuation
value of player i is given by
mi (β(a)) − γi (β(a)) + πi [γ1 (β(a)) + γ2 (β(a))].
I refer to the state-contingent continuation value as a value function and denote it by
g : A → R2 . The definition of a value function and the possibility of renegotiation
between periods 4 and 5 (which justifies restricting attention to balanced externally
enforced transfers) justify restricting attention to balanced value functions. That
11

The model applies equally well to other external enforcement systems.
See, for example, Barnett (1999).
13
Further, this constraint may reflect the players’ ability to renegotiate between periods 4 and
5. Suppose the players can renegotiate the externally-enforced contract m0 (or m if no renegotiation
outcome is reached) between periods 4 and 5. If their outstanding contract is such that
P
m
i (E) < 0 for some E, then following disclosure E the players would re-specify m before the
i=1,2
court compels transfers.
12
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is, I restrict attention to value functions of the form g : A → R20 . An externallyenforced contract m and a disclosure rule β imply the value function g. The following
terminology will be useful.
Definition 1 A value function g is implemented by externally enforced contract m and disclosure rule β if gi (a) = mi (β(a))−γi (β(a))+πi [γ1 (β(a))+γ2 (β(a))]
for every a ∈ A, for i = 1, 2.
The notion is that for a given m, β, and a, the players know what will be the
outcome of going to court. Their renegotiation (pretrial settlement) results in the
value g(a). I require that players use disclosure rules that induce Nash equilibrium in
the evidence production game for all contingencies. Given m, I call β an equilibrium
disclosure rule if β specifies an equilibrium of the evidence production game for every
a; that is,
mi (β(a)) − γi (β(a)) ≥ mi (Ei ∪ βj (a)) − γi (Ei ∪ βj (a))
for any Ei ⊂ Di (a), for all a ∈ A, and for each i = 1, 2. I describe the value functions
that can be implemented given equilibrium behavior in the evidence production game
as follows.
Definition 2 A value function g is called implemented by equilibrium disclosure rule β if and only if there exists an externally enforced contract m such that
(i) β is an equilibrium disclosure rule and (ii) g is implemented by m and β.
My analysis focuses on the implementable value functions as these describe the
payoffs players expect to receive conditional on the state (which summarizes behavior
in the production phase of the relationship).14 I consider whether a value function
g can be implemented given a disclosure rule β since the particular β is crucial in
determining which states can be differentiated. That is, the continuation values may
differ under different equilibrium disclosure rules because both the cost of equilibrium
evidence production and the equilibrium enforced transfers may differ.

2

Illustrative Examples

In this section, I begin to explore the relationship between evidence costs and the
value functions that can be implemented. My aim is to better understand when
additional equilibrium evidence cost is useful and when it is a hindrance. This is
relevant for the design of legal institutions with regard to evidence admissibility laws.
By placing more weight on certain types of evidence, it may be possible for the legal
institution to influence the cost of equilibrium evidence production in a beneficial
14

Thus, the value function shapes players’ incentives in the production phase. For a full treatment
of the relationship between productive outcomes that can be induced and implementable value
functions, see Bull and Watson (2004).
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way. Both the available evidence and the cost structure influence the value functions
that can be implemented. I begin by showing, through two examples, how the setting
of costly evidence differs from that of costless evidence.

Example 1: Costly Evidence Restricts Implementability
Consider the following some what stylized scenario of a sale of goods contract.15
The seller S can either deliver the product (state a) or not deliver the product (state
b). The a and b can be thought of as “alright” and “bad.” These are the only two
states. When the product has been delivered the buyer B can document that it is
in his possession by presenting the good. This is represented by the buyer disclosing
document d. However, when it has not been delivered, the buyer has nothing to
present for evidence. The seller possesses no evidence in either state. Assume that
value of delivery of the good to the buyer is much more than the cost savings to the
seller of non-delivery, implying that it is efficient for the good to be delivered.
Here disclosure of d is considered positive evidence of state a since the buyer can
produce this document in state a but not state b. Further, nondisclosure of d is
considered negative evidence of b because the buyer cannot disclose d in state b but
can disclose the document in state a. I say that player i can positively distinguish state
a from state b when i possesses a document in state a that she does not possess in
state b. In this example, the buyer can positively distinguish a, delivery has occured,
from b, non-delivery.
Consider first the case where the production of d is costless. That is, it costs the
buyer nothing to produce the document d and it costs the seller nothing when the
buyer produces d, or γB ({d}) = γS ({d}) = 0. Remember that the buyer possesses
the document. Hence the buyer must be given the incentive to produce d if the
transfers are to be different in each state. This requires mB ({d}) ≥ mB (∅). As
there is no cost of evidence production here, gB (a) = mB ({d}) and gB (b) = mB (∅).
Thus, it is possible to implement any g such that gB (a) ≥ gB (b). When evidence
production is costless, the value function must “favor” a player who can positively
distinguish one state from another.16 Here this means that the buyer must be made
better off by producing document d, and since there is no cost, this is reflected by
gB (a) ≥ gB (b). This implies, in this example, there does not exist a contract that
implements the efficient outcome of delivery of the good. Note that in the costless
setting, it makes no difference whether players can settle prior to trial because the
surplus from renegotiating is zero.17
Suppose, instead, that the buyer’s production of d has a cost of 10 to the buyer
and no cost to the seller. That is, γB ({d}) = 10 and γS ({d}) = 0. This is represented
15
This is a stylized example that is intended to provide some concreteness to the simplest analytical
example that makes my points concerning evidence cost. Thus, I abstract from the possibility of
the seller requiring that the buyer sign for the good and other steps that may be taken in reality.
16
This notion is developed fully in Bull and Watson (2004).
17
This is because with no evidence production cost the surplus from pretrial settlement is zero.
Thus, m0 = m.
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Figure 2: Example – evidence cost reduces the set of implementable value functions.
in Figure 2. This is more realistic as it is in fact costly for the buyer to present the
good. The cost to each player is indicated where the document is available (with
the buyer’s cost first), and a dash indicates where the document is not available. I
assume equal bargaining weights; that is, πB = πS = 1/2. If the gain in the buyer’s
transfer of disclosing d is less than 10, she will not produce the document (under m)
in state a. That is, the document is never produced when mB ({d}) − mB(∅) < 10.
This is because the buyer receives a lower overall payoff by producing d (and bearing
the cost of 10) than she would by just not producing it. When this is the case the
buyer will not distinguish state a from state b, which implies gB (a) = gB (b).
Now suppose that m is set so that mB ({d}) − mB (∅) ≥ 10. This implies that the
buyer would actually disclose d if the evidence production stage were reached. Recall
the definition of a value function. Here this implies that
gB (a) = mB ({d}) − γB ({d}) + πB [γB ({d}) + γS ({d})],
or
gB (a) = mB ({d}) − 10 + 5 = mB ({dB }) − 5.
Rearranging implies gB (a) + 5 = mB ({d}). Since there is no cost associated with
withholding a document, it must be that gB (b) = mB (∅). Substituting these two
expressions into mB ({d}) − 10 ≥ mB (∅) yields gB (a) ≥ gB (b) + 5. Thus, any value
function g where gB (a) ≥ gB (b) + 5 can be implemented by a suitably chosen contract
m. This suggests that there must be a “gap” between gB (a) and gB (b) (unless gB (a) =
gB (b)). Clearly, the larger is γB (d), the larger is the gap. Thus, in this example, the
cost of evidence production exacerbates the difficulty of implementing the efficient
outcome where the good is delivered.
Note that the renegotiation between the production phase and evidence production phase, in addition to the costly evidence production, leads to this gap. If there
were no renegotiation, then the buyer’s overall continuation payoff following productive interaction could be made arbitrarily small by setting mB (d) close to γB ({d}),
giving the buyer a small incentive to disclose d.18 However, without renegotiation,
value functions are not balanced, and this type of m does not, in general, prevent the
seller’s value function from having a gap.
18

I address the setting of no renegotiation in Appendix C.
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Example 2: Costly Evidence Expands Implementability
Consider the following example. Suppose that the owner of a factory hires a contractor to improve the factory machinery. A properly performed job by the contractor
allows the production line to operate at a faster rate that is more efficient. For simplicity, assume that there are only two possible rates when the improvements have
been made properly. These are the faster rate and the old rate at which the inefficient
machinery operated. Further, assume that if unproperly improved, the machinery can
operate only at the slower rate.19 Suppose that improperly improving the machinery
yields the contractor a cost savings of 4, but that having the more efficient machinery
yields the factory a gain of 100. Clearly, it is efficient for the improvements to be
made.
Denote the “high efficiency” state by H, and the “low efficiency” state by L. Assume that the contractor possesses no documents in either state. The factory owner
potentially possesses two documents df and d0f . In state H she can produce both df
and d0f , but in state L she can only produce df . The factory owner can produce df in
either state at a cost of 16, while production of d0f in state H costs her 4. Assume that
the contractor incurs no evidence production costs regardless of the documents produced by factory owner. Formally, this is D(H) = {df , d0f }, D(L) = {df }, γf ({df }) =
16, γf ({d0f }) = 4, and γc({df }) = γc({d0f }) = 0. This is described in Figure 3. Costs
are additive, implying that γf ({df , d0f }) = 20. Again, assume πf = πc = 1/2. Clearly,
if there were no cost of evidence production, the set of implementable value functions
comprises all value functions satisfying gf (H) ≥ gf (L). This is much like above.
Without evidence production costs, g(H) must favor the player who can positively
distinguish H from L. In this example, the efficient productive outcome cannot be
implemented in a setting of costless evidence production.
With costly evidence production, it is possible to implement gf (H) < gf (L). To
see this, consider an evidence disclosure rule β such that β(H) = {d0f } and β(L) =
{df }. Suppose that m is defined such that mf ({df }) = 13, mf ({d0f }) = 2, mf (∅) =
−4, and mf ({df , d0f }) = 15. Note that given this m, β is an equilibrium disclosure
rule. So
gf (H) = mf ({d0f }) − γf ({d0f }) + πf γf ({d0f }) = 2 − 4 + 2 = 0.
Also,
gf (L) = mf ({df }) − γf ({df }) + πf γf ({df }) = 13 − 16 + 8 = 5.
Thus, m and β implement g such that gf (H) = 0 < gf (L) = 5. Further, if γf ({d0f })
is held constant, the larger γf ({df }) is, the larger the difference between gf (H) and
gf (L) can be made. This shows that, in some settings, additional cost actually allows
19
This example is similar in spirit to an example of Okuno-Fujiwara, Postlewaite, and Suzumura
(1990). However, the emphasis here is on which documents exist in particular contingencies and
the cost of producing those documents. This is some what stylized. It assumes that the contractor
cannot have the machinery run. This is revisited below.
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Figure 3: Example – evidence cost expands the set of implementable value functions.
more value functions to be implemented. In this example, the presence of evidence
production costs allows the efficient productive outcome, the improvements being
made to the factory, to be implemented.

Implications
I let F D (γ) denote the set of value functions that are implementable given a cost
structure γ. I denote by F D (0) the set of value functions that can be implemented
when γi (β(a)) = 0 for all a ∈ A, for i = 1, 2. As the above examples show, neither
set contains the other, in general.20 I state this formally as follows.
Lemma 1 In general, F D (γ) 6⊂ F D (0) and F D (0) 6⊂ F D (γ).
The relationship between the two is made clearer by precisely characterizing those
value functions that can be implemented.

3

Characterization

My main technical result characterizes the value functions that can be implemented
given a particular evidence cost structure. Recall that β must specify an equilibrium disclosure rule in every contingency. This equilibrium behavior in the evidence
production phase provides the disagreement point for the bargaining problem in the
pretrial settlement phase. Thus, each disclosure rule may implement a different set
of value functions. In comparing legal institutions, as well as specific contracts, it is
essential to compare the set of implementable outcomes associated with each alternative.
For each i, I define
Λi (β, E) ≡ {a ∈ A | Ei ⊂ Di (a) and Ej = βj (a)}.
Thus, Λi (β, E) represents the set of states for which player i can unilaterally reach E
when player j discloses documents as prescribed by β. Note that when Λi (β, E) = ∅
it must be that player j deviated from β (though possibly player i deviated as well).
20
I discuss settings where both players can produce documents in Section 4. In Appendix B, I
present an example where a player’s evidence production imposes a cost upon her opponent.
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It is useful to consider how equilibrium behavior in the evidence production game
is related to a given value function g. The definition of g implies
gi (a) − πi [γ1 (β(a)) + γ2 (β(a))] = mi (β(a)) − γi (β(a)).
I define the following upper bound on mi (E).
ẑi (E; β, g) ≡





min [gi (a) − πi [γ1 (β(a)) + γ2 (β(a))]] + γi (E) if Λi (β, E) 6= ∅

a∈Λi (β,E)

∞

if Λi (β, E) = ∅

.

I characterize the set of implementable value functions as follows.
Theorem 1 (Characterization) Take as given a disclosure rule β and a value
function g. There exists an externally enforced contract m such that (i) g is implemented by β and m, and (ii) β is an equilibrium disclosure rule, if and only if
X

ẑi (E; β, g) ≥ 0, for every E ∈ D.

i=1,2

The intuition is as follows. Consider any E ∈ D. If Λi (β, E) 6= ∅, since β is an
equilibrium disclosure rule and the m’s are balanced, there is an upper bound on
mi (E) of
min [gi (a) − πi [γ1 (β(a)) + γ2 (β(a))]] + γi (E).
a∈Λi (β,E)

This is an upper bound since in equilibrium player i must not wish to deviate from
any β(a). If Λi (E, β) = ∅, then it must be that player j deviated. When player j
has deviated to reach E, equilibrium disclosure imposes no upper bound on player i’s
transfer at E. This implies that player j, having deviated, can be punished as harshly
as needed to induce equilibrium disclosure. A given g can be implemented by β and
some m only when the sum of the upper bound on players’ transfers is non-negative
at every E ∈ D. This characterization applies to a particular β. The set of value
functions that one disclosure rule can implement may differ from those that another
disclosure rule will implement. This is because different disclosures may distinguish
between between states differently, and may involve different evidence production
costs.
Thus, g ∈ F D (γ) if and only if g satisfies the condition of Theorem 1 for some β.
So finding the set of implementable value functions F D (γ) requires that one use the
characterization of Theorem 1 for every possible β, and then take the union of the
set of g’s that each β can implement.
Returning to the theme of the above examples, Theorem 1 has implications for
the value functions that can be implemented when one player has additional documents available in one state that she does not disclose in another and her opponent’s
disclosure does not distinguish these states from each other. This is as follows.
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Corollary 1 Suppose that a value function g is implemented by an equilibrium disclosure rule β. If βi (b) ⊂ Di (a) and β specifies that player j disclose the same documents
in either state (βj (a) = βj (b)), then it must be that gi (a) − πi [γ1 (β(a)) + γ2 (β(a))] ≥
gi (b) − πi [γ1 (β(b)) + γ2 (β(b))].
The intuition is that, with this type of disclosure rule and evidence environment,
player i can pretend that state b has occured when state a has. So she must be
motivated to disclose βi (a). Note that Corollary 1 has implications both on the basis
of player i’s disclosure rule and available evidence. When βi (b) ⊂ βi (a), it must be
that βi (b) ⊂ Di (a). Further, Di (b) ⊂ Di (a) implies βi (b) ⊂ βi (a). When evidence is
costly, it is gi (a)−πi [γ1 (β(a))+γ2 (β(a))] that must favor the player who distinguishes
a from b when her opponent does not. To see this recall that the definition of the
value function implies that gi (a) − πi [γ1 (β(a)) + γ2 (β(a))] = mi (β(a)) − γi (β(a)).
That is, player 1’s payoff from distinguishing that it is state a must be higher than
her payoff from acting like it is state b.
Consider the implications of Corollary 1 for the examples above. In Example 1
when γ1 ({d1 }) = 10 this implies that, for β such that β(a) = {d1 }, g1 (a) − 5 ≥ g1 (b).
For Example 2, consider β such that β(a) = {d01 } and β(b) = {d1 }. Substituting into
the inequality of Corollary 1 implies g1 (a) − 2 ≥ g1 (b) − 8 or g1 (a) + 6 ≥ g1 (b). This,
of course, is consistent with the described m yielding g1 (a) = 4 < g1 (b) = 9. In each
of these examples, player 1 receives a higher payoff by disclosing β(a), and showing
that the state is a, than she does by disclosing β(b).

4

Redundant Documents

In practice there are often multiple documents that exist in the same states. For
example in a sale of goods contract, the buyer may be able to prove that she has
paid the seller by producing a receipt issued by the seller or by producing a canceled
check. How these documents are treated by the court and how costly they are to
produce may have implications for those value functions that can be implemented.
When two documents exist in the same set of states, I refer to these documents as
being redundant. I state this formally as follows.
Definition 3 Documents d and d0 are called redundant if d ∈ D(a) if and only if
d0 ∈ D(a).
When there are redundant documents, it may be possible to implement a larger class
of value functions than when there is only a single document.

Example 3: Redundant Documents and Implementability
The following example illustrates one setting where redundant documents expand
the set of implementable value functions. Suppose there are two states, a and b. Only
player 1 can produce documents. In state a player 1 can produce documents d1 , d01 ,
13

Figure 4: Example – evidence redundancy.
and d001 . In state b she can produce documents d1 and d001 . Each document costs 4 for
player 1 to produce, regardless of the state. I assume that costs are additive. So, for
example, γ1 ({d1 , d01 }) = 8. The availability of documents and the cost per document
are represented in Figure 4. Player 1’s production of evidence imposes no cost on
player 2. I assume π1 = π2 = 1/2.
Here, d1 and d001 are redundant. To see the value of having a redundant document,
consider first the disclosure rule that does not specify the disclosure of d1 or d001 in any
state, but does differentiate between states a and b. Suppose that β specifies that
β(a) = d01 and β(b) = ∅. Then it must be that
g1 (a) − π1 γ1 (d01 ) ≥ g1 (b).
Note that other deviations can easily be prevented by making the transfer conditional
only on whether d01 is disclosed. This implies that g1 (a) ≥ g1 (b) + 2.
Next consider β such that β(a) = {d01 } and β(b) = {d1 }. Here, player 1 produces
evidence in each contingency as opposed to just indicating when state a has occured.
This requires that
g1 (a) − π1 γ1 ({d01 }) ≥ g1 (b) − π1 γ1 ({d1 }) ≥ m1 (∅).
Other deviations are easily dealt with here, as well. Thus it must be that g1 (a) ≥
g1 (b). Here the additional document cost is useful in that it reduces the gap between
g(a) and g(b). Of course, this is specific to this cost structure and bargaining weights.
But, in this example, any value function such that g1 (a) ≥ g1 (b) can be implemented
by a disclosure rule that never specifies the disclosure of both redundant documents
(meaning d001 is never disclosed). This is the same as could be implemented without
costs.
Now consider use of a disclosure rule that specifies the disclosure of both redundant
documents. Suppose that β is such that β(a) = {d01 } and β(b) = {d1 , d001 }. This
requires that
g1 (a) − π1 γ1 ({d01 }) ≥ g1 (b) − π1 γ1 ({d1 , d001 }) ≥ m1 (∅).
As before, other deviations are easily prevented. The set of value functions that
can be implemented by this β are characterized by g1 (a) + 2 ≥ g1 (b). So here the
redundancy is useful, and it allows a wider range of value functions to be implemented
14

than in the costless disclosure setting. The intuition is that the redundancy allows for
increasing the cost of γ1 (β(b)) (should the evidence production game be reached) and
this strengthens the incentive to disclose β(a) when β(a) is available. This allows for
decreasing the gap between g1 (a) and g1 (b). In the example the redundancy allows the
players to contract in a way so that a relatively large cost is incurred when β(a) is not
disclosed.21 However, as the examples of Section 5 demonstrate, it is not necessary
that a document exist in all states for its cost to be useful in this type of manner.
In general, having redundant documents provides the flexibility for the players to
adjust the cost of equilibrium disclosure to suit a particular value function. Legal
institutions can be designed exploit this feature.
Deneckere and Severinov (2001) study a similar notion in a principal-agent, mechanism design model where communication is costly. One setting they study is such
that stating the truth about the state is costless to the agent, but lying is costly.22
The principal can design a contract requiring the agent stating the state n < ∞ times
that induces the agent to truthfully report the state. This is similar in spirit to the
above example in which the redundant documents are used to make it more expensive
for player 1 to avoid disclosing the distinguishing document.

Aside: Message Game Phenomena
In certain settings if two states have the same documents, say D(a) = D(b),
and there are redundant documents, different value functions can be implemented in
each of those states. To see this, consider the following example. Suppose D1 (a) =
D1 (b) = {d1 , d01 } and D2 (a) = D2 (b) = {d2 , d02 }. Let γ be such that γ1 ({d1 }) =
6, γ1 ({d01 }) = 2, γ2 ({d2 }) = 2, and γ2 ({d02 }) = 6. This is represented in Figure 5(a). Further, assume that player i’s cost is additive and is only influenced by those
documents player i produces. So, for example γ1 ({d1 , d01 }) = 8. If the players agree
to a contract where the self-enforced component implies β(a) = {d1 , d2 } and β(b) =
{d01 , d02 } and the relevant externally enforced component is given by m1 ({d1 , d2 }) =
12, m1 ({d01 , d02 }) = 4, and m1 ({d1 d02 }) = m1 ({d01 , d2 }) = 8. Note that any disclosure
such that Ei = {di , d0i } or ∅ can be prevented by specifying m so that player i is
punished severely if player i makes such a disclosure when player j discloses either
dj or d0j . This implies Ei = {di , d0i } and Ei = ∅ are dominated for i = 1, 2. Thus the
relevant portion of the evidence production game is represented in Figure 5 (b). If
the evidence production game is reached in state a, the players disclose {d1 , d2 }. This
implies g1 (a) = m1 ({d1 , d2 }) − γ1 ({d1 }) + π1 [γ1 ({d1 }) + γ2 ({d2 })] = 12 − 6 + 4 = 10.
Similarly, if the evidence production game is reached in state b, the players disclose
{d01 , d02 }. So g1 (b) = m1 ({d01 , d02 }) − γ1 ({d01 }) + π1 [γ1 ({d01 }) + γ2 ({d02 })] = 4 − 2 + 4 = 6.
21

In some sense, this can be viewed as the players being able to commit to “burn money” when
β(a) is not disclosed.
22
I believe that it is straight forward to extend my Theorem 1 to allow the cost of producing a
particular evidence set to be state dependant. This would allow for studying the forging of documents
or lying, but the focus of this paper is on how the existence and non-existence of documents and
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Figure 5: Example – evidence cost and evidence production game.
This is interesting as D(a) = D(b), but g(a) 6= g(b). In some sense this is a
“message game phenomenon” as the same documents are available in each state,
but settlement results in different transfers in each state. I emphasize that this is
an anomaly, and I think of little practical interest. The intuition of this example
is that for the right cost structure and externally enforced component, the evidence
production game may have multiple equilibria that have different payoffs, and the
players can use the self-enforcing component of the contract to coordinate on an
equilibrium given the state. The difference in payoffs implies, since the total cost of
the two equilibrium disclosures specified by β are the same, that g(a) 6= g(b).
This differs from the usual message game type results in two key ways. The first
is that documents are not cheap here. I emphasize that evidence is not the same as
the cheap message that is central to the message game literature.23 Evidence actually
conveys information. If there were no cost associated with producing documents (as
is the case in the message game literature), this would be a zero-sum game. It is
well known that in a two player, zero-sum game that all Nash equilibria result in the
same payoffs. Thus no cost implies g(a) = g(b) when D(a) = D(b). The second, and
more important, distinction is that this type of phenomena does not hold in any sort
of general manner. This is because a very limited type of cost structure is needed in
order for this type of phenomena to hold.

5

The Implications of Two Legal Rules

There is a sense in the law of the United States that litigants ought to have equal
access to the available evidence, and that the ruling of the court should be based on
the evidence put before it without regard to which litigant presented what evidence.
The former notion is more clearly embedded in the law. I briefly explore how these
two notions influence those value functions that can be implemented.
the associated cost of producing it influences what can be considered verifiable.
23
Bull and Watson (2004) show that when coalitions are possible in an n-player setting of costless,
but state-dependant, evidence production that message game phenomena are not possible.
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Enforced Discovery Requests
In the adversarial system of fact-finding, litigants are typically permitted to request evidence from each other in the process known as “discovery”. Recall that I
have assumed that players have common knowledge of the availability and content of
documents. Here I consider a setting where the legal institution enables each litigant
to request and actually receive with certainty documents from her opponent. That is,
a player can force her opponent to produce and disclose a desired document. I term
this a setting of enforced discovery requests. It may be that when a player requests a
document that she incurs a request cost in addition to her cost associated with production of the document. As the cost structure is not crucial here, I defer discussion
of the exact nature of the request cost until below.
I am interested in studying how each player having access to all producable evidence influences the implementable value functions. I take as given that these requests are in fact enforced. Here, I do not study the possibility of the suppression
of evidence.24 Certainly, in practice enforced discovery requests may be difficult to
implement. Players may have the incentive to destroy or suppress evidence.25 Further, litigants may have different incentives in the discovery process. Cooter and
Rubinfeld (1994) characterize an efficient level of discovery requests. Practical measures to address the problem of excessive discovery requests are suggested in Cooter
and Rubinfeld (1995). My analysis does not address these issues, but does suggest
that further attention should be devoted to improving the workings of the discovery
process.26 Much of literature has focused on cases of asymmetric information.27 In
these settings discovery allows parties to become informed. Here discovery allows
parties to be able to convey similar information.28
I capture the setting of enforced discovery requests by assuming that, each player
has a redundant document for each of the documents in the possession of the other
player. Formally, I assume D = {D 1 , D2 , . . . , D K }, where D k ≡ {dk1 , dk2 } and Di ≡
k
k
{d1i , d2i , . . . , dK
i } such that d1 and d2 are redundant for each k. Thus, if one player
can positively distinguish a from b, then her opponent can do so as well.
Denote by F D the set of value functions implemented by equilibrium disclosure
rules for any γ. That is, F D is the set of value functions that are not sensitive to
the actual cost structure. Note that g ∈ F D if and only if g satisfies the condition
of Theorem 1 for some β. Consider an arbitrary partition P of the state space. For
any state a, P (a) denotes the element of the partition containing a; that is, b ∈ P (a)
if and only if a and b are in the same element of the partition P . I denote by G(P )
24

I do study a model that allows the suppression of evidence in Bull (2001).
Brazil (1978) and Shapiro (1979) provide practical evidence which suggests that in practice the
discovery process does not result in the intended open exchange of information because parties seek
to suppress evidence. See, also, Eastbrook (1989).
26
For a discussion of the current law with regard to discovery, see Chandler (2001).
27
See, for example, Shavell (1989).
28
Bull and Watson (2004) show that discovery is beneficial in a setting of costless evidence production.
25
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the set of value functions that are measurable with respect to P . Let P D denote the
partition of A induced by the notion of distinguishing between states. Formally P D
is defined so that a ∈ P D (b) if and only if D(a) = D(b). The following definition is
useful.
Definition 4 The full disclosure rule β is defined by β(a) ≡ D(a) for all a ∈ A.
With full disclosure, each player submits all of the documents in his possession in
every state. In a setting of enforced discovery requests, F D is not constrained by the
failure of positive evidence.
Theorem 2 Suppose that the legal rule of enforced discovery requests is in effect.
Then, regardless of γ, the difference between positive and negative evidence is not
critical, and full disclosure rules can induce G(P D ) = F D .
The intuition is that in state a players are induced to disclose β(a) because for each
of player i’s documents player j has a document, and if player i does not disclose
a document for which j discloses his corresponding document, i can be punished
arbitrarily harshly. Thus, the punishment for unilaterally deviating from a full disclosure equilibrium can be made large enough to offset any evidence production costs
associated with full disclosure.
It is interesting that this setting is one where evidence production is costly, but
all implementable value functions can be characterized by considering only those disclosure rules that involve disclosure of all available documents in each contingency.29
When evidence production is costless this result is quite intuitive. One player will
always have the incentive to disclose any available document, and given that she is
disclosing that document, her opponent will be indifferent about disclosing his corresponding document. However, when evidence production is costly this result relies
upon “forcing” the player for whom a given document is not beneficial to incur the
associated cost and disclose it. This is done by the court being able to differentiate the transfers imposed based upon whether a player has disclosed the redundant
documents corresponding to those disclosed by his opponent.
In many legal settings this is not a reasonable assumption. Often the court is
viewed as applying the rules of law to the facts of the case. Obviously, the facts of
the case are proven by the evidence disclosed, but who disclosed that evidence may
not be relevant to the facts of the case. Thus, in many settings it is appropriate to
constrain the transfers to reflect this. Further, the meaning of simultaneous evidence
production is unclear.
29

Bull and Watson (2004) show, when evidence production is costless, that all implementable
value functions can be characterized by constraining attention to only full disclosure rules. They
consider “transfer functions” which result from external enforcement. In a costless setting these are
equal to the value functions described here.
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Transfers That Do Not Distinguish Between Redundant Documents
I now depart from the assumption of enforced discovery requests, and first consider
the case where the court does not differentiate transfers on the basis of redundant
documents. This is motivated by the legal argument that court action should be
based upon what the evidence proves and not on who discloses it. See, for example,
Tepley and Whitten (2000) for a discussion of rules of civil procedure. The court is
to apply the rules of law to the facts of the case before it. The facts are established
by the disclosure of evidence. Notions of fairness may suggest that the same transfers
be imposed whether the plaintiff or the defendant presented the convincing evidence.
This differs from much of the treatment in the mechanism design literature, which
allows for conditioning on who sends messages. However, when evidence exists in
some contingencies and not in others, there is greater sense of what constitutes the
facts of the case.
Let
J(E) ≡ {d ∈ D | there exists d0 ∈ E such that d, d0 are redundant}.
I reflect this constraint on transfers by the requirement that m(E) = m(E 0 ) whenever
J(E) = J(E 0 ). Note that this differs slightly from the case where transfers do not
condition on which player requested a particular document.30
The set of evidence sets that must have the same transfer is denoted by
Ω(E) ≡ {E 0 ∈ D | J(E 0 ) = J(E)}.
I define the upper bound on mi (E) to be
ψi (E; β, g) ≡ 0min ẑi (E 0 ; β, g).
E ∈Ω(E)

Given this constraint on transfers, I characterize those value functions that can be
implemented as follows.
Theorem 3 (Characterization) Suppose that the court cannot condition on which
player produces a redundant document (m(E) = m(E 0 ) whenever J(E) = J(E 0 )).
Take as given a disclosure rule β and a value function g. There exists an externally
enforced contract m such that (i) g is implemented by β and m, and (ii) β is an
equilibrium disclosure rule, if and only if
X

ψi (E; β, g) ≥ 0, for every E ∈ D.

i=1,2

30
As I discuss below this may actually be the more appropriate constraint. However, here I
consider a setting that does not have enforced discovery requests. So the request notion is not
particularly relevant.
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The intuition is similar to that of Theorem 1. As before ẑi (E; β, g) represents an upper
bound on mi (E). However, now the constraint that m(E) = m(E 0 ) whenever J(E) =
J(E 0 ) implies that the relevant upperbound on m(E) is the minimum ẑi (E 0 ; β, g) for
any E 0 such that J(E) = J(E 0 ).
D
I denote by F (γ) the set of implementable value functions under this constraint
on m. This reduces the set of implementable value functions.
Corollary 2 If the court cannot condition on which player produces a redundant
document (m(E) = m(E 0 ) whenever J(E) = J(E 0 )), then the set of implementable
D
value functions is reduced, so F (γ) ⊂ F D (γ).
Note that with this constraint message game phenomena, as discussed in the example
in Section 4, do not exist.

Enforced Discovery Requests with Constrained Transfers
Now I study the implication of having both of these legal rules in place. The set
of implementable value functions under both legal rules will be somewhere between
those under each rule individually. Note that if enforced discovery requests are introduced in a setting that requires m(E) = m(E 0 ) whenever J(E) = J(E 0 ), the set of
implementable value functions will be enlarged.
Corollary 3 In a setting where the court cannot condition on which player produces
a redundant document (m(E) = m(E 0 ) whenever J(E) = J(E 0 )), allowing enforced
discovery requests always (weakly) expands the set of implementable value functions.
D1
D 1 ∪D 2
That is, F ⊂ F
.
This is because any m and β that implement a value function without enforced
requests can also be used with enforced requests. How much the setting of enforced
discovery requests increases the set of implementable value functions depends upon
the particular evidence environment.
To illustrate the relationship between the evidence environment and the set of implementable value functions I consider a series of examples. These examples assume a
common cost structure, in which both parties’ costs of producing and requesting documents are the same.31 Further, I represent enforced discovery requests as previously
described on page 17. I assume that if a player desires that a particular document be
produced, that she must pay a request cost. Further, I assume that the request cost
is the same across players and documents. I describe this more formally as follows.
Let θk ∈ R2+ denote the cost of producing a document of type k. For E ∈ D let
C(E) ≡ {k | dki ∈ E for some i = 1, 2}.
31

This common cost structure is not necessary to make the points concerning the evidence environment and implementable value functions under these two legal rules. However, it captures the
notion of discovery quite well and facilitates the exposition.
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Figure 6: Example – enforced discovery increases implementability.
Let ηi (E) ≡ #{k | dki ∈ E}. I denote the cost of requesting a single document by ε.
Thus,
X
θk + εηi (E).
γi (E) ≡
k∈C(E)

Note that this cost structure implies that if both players request a document of type
k, each incurs θk + ε.

Example 4: Enforced Discovery Increases Implementability
Suppose there are two states, a and b. In state a, a document can be produced.
In state b no document can be produced. Suppose there are no enforced discovery
requests and player 1 possesses the document d1 . From the above assumptions on
cost, γ1 ({d1 }) = θ + ε and γ2 ({d1 }) = θ. Then by Corollary 1 any value function
such that either g1 (a) − π1 [2θ + ε] ≥ g1 (b) or g(a) = g(b) can be implemented. A
practical motivation for this example would be quite similar to that of the sale of
goods contract in Example 1.
Now suppose that enforced discovery requests are allowed, meaning that player
2 possesses document d2 in state a. In the context of the sale of goods contract in
Example 1, this means that both players can cause the final product to be disclosed.
For β such that β(a) = {d1 }, it is possible to implement g1 (a) − π1 [2θ + ε] ≥ g1 (b).
This is represented in Figure 6. For β such that β(a) = {d2 }, it is possible to implement g2 (a) − π2 [2θ + ε] ≥ g2 (b) or g1 (a) + (1 − π1 )[2θ + ε] ≤ g1 (b). Thus, the
set of implementable value functions is enlarged by allowing enforced discovery requests. However, as it must be that m({d1 }) = m({d2 }) = m({d1 , d2 }) no equilibrium
disclosure will involve both d1 and d2 being disclosed. Further, there must always
be a gap between g1 (a) and g1 (b) unless g1 (a) = g1 (b). This gap, of course, is due
to the requirement that transfers not differentiate on the basis of how state a was
distinguished.

Example 5: Document Overlap
Suppose there are three states, a, b, and c. Assume there are two types of documents. The first is available in state a. The second is available in both states a and
b. This is represented in Figure 7. If both documents are only available to player i,
then there must be a gap between gi (a) and gi (c). Clearly, if only the first type of
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Figure 7: Example – the availability of a non-distinguishing document helps close the
gap.
document were available to both players (that is d1 and d2 ), then there would have
to be a gap as was described in Example 4.
However, here the difference between g1 (a) and g1 (c) is unconstrained. To see this,
consider β such that β(a) = {d1 , d02 }, β(b) = {d02 }, and β(c) = ∅. Inducing player 2 to
disclose d02 requires that g2 (b) − π2 [2θ0 + ε] ≥ g2 (c) or g1 (b) + (1 − π1 )[2θ0 + ε] ≤ g1 (c).
Note that m2 ({d1 }) can be set as harshly as is needed to induce player 2 to disclose
d02 in state a. For player 1 to disclose d1 in state a, we need
g1 (a) − π1 2[θ + θ0 + ε] ≥ g1 (b) − π1 [2θ0 + ε]
or
g1 (a) ≥ g1 (b) + π1 2θ.
As the two constraints only require that both g1 (a) and g1 (c) be sufficiently larger
than g1 (b), the gap between g1 (a) and g1 (c) is unconstrained. The notion is that the
availability of an extra document that does not distinguish state a from the other
states may be useful if it is available to both players.

Example 6: A Different Document Overlap
Now consider the three state, two document type example described in Figure 8.
Suppose, for comparison, that neither document type is available to player 2. Then
by straightforward application of Corollary 1, it is easy to see that any disclosure
such that β(a) 6= β(b) requires g1 (b) > g1 (a). However, when both documents are
available to both players, this gap can be reduced. To see this, consider β such that
β(a) = {d1 }, β(b) = {d1 , d02 }, and β(c) = {d02 }.
To induce player 1 to disclose d1 in state b it must be that
g1 (b) − π1 2[θ + θ0 + ε] ≥ g1 (c) − π1 [2θ + ε].
In state a it requires be that g1 (a)−π1 [2θ +ε] ≥ m1 (∅). To induce player 2 to produce
d02 in state b requires
g2 (b) − π2 2[θ + θ0 + ε] ≥ g2 (a) − π2 [2θ + ε].
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Figure 8: Example – the availability of an related document helps close the gap.
As the g’s are balanced, this implies g1 (b) ≤ g1 (a) − (1 − π1 )[2θ0 + ε]. That player 2
discloses d02 in state c requires g2 (c) − π2 [2θ0 + ε] ≥ m2 (∅), or g1 (c) − (1 − π1 )[2θ0 + ε] ≤
m1 (∅). Combining these yields
g1 (a) + π1 [2θ + ε] ≤ g1 (b) ≤ g1 (a) − (1 − π1 )[2θ0 + ε].
Thus, the gap between g1 (a) and g1 (b) is closed. Here again a document that is only
slightly related to the states of concern is quite useful.

Implications For Legal Institutions
The clearest implication of this research for legal institutions is that enforced
discovery is beneficial because it expands the set of implementable value functions.
However, the effectiveness of enforced discovery requests is reduced when it is combined with the restriction on transfers that prevents the court from conditioning on
who produced which documents. Certainly, this legal rule is not followed as systematically as that of discovery. To be sure, there is a tension between this legal principle
and the ability to implement a large set of value functions.
As the above examples concerning the overlap of documents suggest, the negative
impact of this restriction may be lessened by the use of slightly related evidence
that does not distinguish between the two states in question. This may in fact be
consistent with the popular view of litigation. A typical complaint of people who
have been involved in litigation is that attorneys tend to ask questions or present
evidence concerning things which are only tangentially related. It may be that these
attorneys are simply using these extra documents to their fullest.
Another possible way to lessen the impact of this type of restriction on transfers
is to simply require that transfers cannot condition on which player requested a particular document rather than requiring the same transfers not differentiate between
redundant documents. This would allow for greater flexibility from the use of redundant documents. Returning to the sale of goods example in Section 4, this would
imply that the court would treat the buyer disclosing the canceled check the same as
the seller forcing the disclosure of the canceled check, but it could treat these events
differently from the buyer disclosing the receipt. As the discussion of Section 4 sug23

gests, redundant documents allow for more flexibility of the value functions, which
implies a larger set of enforceable contracts.

6

Conclusion

I have presented a model of contract enforcement in which verifiability depends upon
litigants’ costly production of evidence. The model treats evidence as documents,
the availability of which are state dependant. My analysis has focused on the setting where players can settle their dispute prior to litigation and thus avoid the cost
of actually producing evidence. I have characterized how incentives in the production of evidence influence those outcomes of settlement that can be implemented,
which determines the contracts that parties will agree to initially. The presence of
evidence production costs both allows outcomes to be implemented that could not
be implemented in a costless setting, and prevents the implementation of some outcomes which can be implemented in a costless setting. My results show that contract
enforcement is sensitive to both the manner in which states can be distinguished
from each other and the cost of doing so. Further, I have studied the flexibility that
redundant documents provide.
In the productive interaction, players are motivated by the value function that is
induced by their contract. Thus, enlarging the set of implementable value functions
can increase the set of implementable productive outcomes. The legal institution can
influence the set of implementable value functions by influencing evidence production
cost through evidence admissibility laws. As the results of this paper suggest, in some
evidence environments having available additional evidence of the appropriate cost
will expand the set of implementable outcomes. This suggests that legal institutions
ought to consider the cost and availability of various documents when determining
rules that influence the level of proof as well when setting evidence admissibility
standards.
My approach differs from that which is typically taken in the law and the law and
economics literatures. Here, evidence has informative content on the basis of which
documents are available in some states and not in others, and evidence is costly to
produce. I have briefly examined some implications for legal institutions, and see this
as a promising direction for further research. This would include the more detailed
comparison of institutions on the basis of default rules, evidence admissibility rules,
and burden of proof issues. These are particularly interesting issues to study since
the institutional design may be able to influence the cost associated with producing
evidence. Other interesting directions for future research include (a) allowing for the
sequential disclosure of evidence, (b) studying settings in which players have private
information about the availability of documents, (c) permitting settings which have
n > 2 players, and (d) examining settlement in a more detailed model.
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A

Proofs Not in the Text

Proof of Theorem 1
(Necessity) Suppose β is an equilibrium disclosure rule, but
X

ẑi (E; β, g) < 0, for some E ∈ D.

i=1,2

Equilibrium disclosure requires mi (β(a)) − γi (β(a)) ≥ mi (Ei ∪ βj (a)) − γi (Ei ∪
P
βj (a)), for i = 1, 2, for any Ei ⊂ Di (a), for all a ∈ A. But if i=1,2 ẑi (E; β, g) <
0, for some E ∈ D, then (since gi (a) = mi (β(a)) − γi (βi (a)) + πi [γ1 (β(a)) + γ2 (β(a))]
P
and i=1,2 mi = 0) for some a, β is not an equilibrium disclosure.
P
(Sufficiency) Take any E ∈ D. That i=1,2 ẑi (E; β, g) ≥ 0, for every E ∈ D implies the existence of an enforced contract m : D → R20 such that gi (a) − πi [γ1 (β(a)) +
γ2 (β(a))] + γi (E) ≥ mi (E) for all a ∈ Λi (β, E), for every E ∈ D, and each i = 1, 2.
This implies mi (β(a)) − γi (β(a)) ≥ mi (Ei ∪ βj (a)) − γi (Ei ∪ βj (a)) for any Ei ⊂ Di (a),
for all a ∈ A, and for each i = 1, 2. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 2
Consider disclosure rules which specify β(a) = D(a) for all a ∈ A. Take any g and
E ∈ D. First consider the case where E is such that for l(a) ∈ {1, 2} it is the case
that Dl(a) (a) = El(a) and E−l(a) ⊂ D−l(a) (a) (strictly) for some a ∈ A. I proceed by
finding all a’s such that for some l(a) ∈ {1, 2} Dl(a) (a) = El(a) and E−l(a) ⊂ D−l(a) (a)
(strictly). Let Ã denote the set of such a’s. It can be shown that ∩a∈Ã − l(a) 6= ∅.
As ∩a∈Ã − l(a) 6= ∅, and the court can always tell that at least one player has
deviated at any such E. This implies that for any such E, it is always the case that
P
i=1,2 ẑi (E; β, g) ≥ 0.
Next, consider E such that E = β(a) for some a ∈ A. It must be that g1 (a) −
π1 [γ1 (β(a)) + γ2 (β(a))] + γ1 (β(a)) + g2 (a) − π2 [γ1 (β(a)) + γ2 (β(a))] + γ2 (β(a)) = 0.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 3
(Necessity) Suppose β is an equilibrium disclosure rule, but
X

ψi (E; β, g) < 0, for some E ∈ D.

i=1,2

Equilibrium disclosure requires mi (β(a)) − γi (β(a)) ≥ mi (Ei ∪ βj (a)) − γi (Ei ∪
P
βj (a)), for i = 1, 2, for any Ei ⊂ Di (a), for all a ∈ A. But if i=1,2 ψi (E; β, g) <
0, for some E ∈ D, then (since gi (a) = mi (β(a)) − γi (βi (a)) + πi [γ1 (β(a)) + γ2 (β(a))]
P
and i=1,2 mi = 0) for some a, β is not an equilibrium disclosure.
P
(Sufficiency) Take any E ∈ D. That i=1,2 ψi (E; β, g) ≥ 0, for every E ∈ D
implies the existence of an enforced contract m : D → R20 where m(E) = m(E 0 )
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whenever J(E) = J(E 0 ) such that gi (a) − πi [γ1 (β(a)) + γ2 (β(a))] + γi (E) ≥ mi (E)
for all a ∈ Λi (β, E), for every E ∈ D, and each i = 1, 2. This implies mi (β(a)) −
γi (β(a)) ≥ mi (Ei ∪ βj (a)) − γi (Ei ∪ βj (a)) for any Ei ⊂ Di (a), for all a ∈ A, and for
each i = 1, 2. Q.E.D.

B

Costly Evidence – Two Sided Cost

Here I consider a setting like Example 1, but now player 1’s evidence production
imposes a cost on player 2. A stylized example of this might be a setting where a
construction contractor has installed a piping system in the yard of a homeowner
and only the contractor knows where the piping is located. Perhaps the contractor
can prove the quality of the piping, but the contractor must be who produces the
evidence. This scenario implies that the contractor’s digging up the piping in the
yard to produce the evidence imposes a cost on the homeowner — the homeowner
must suffer the yard being made less attractive for some period of time.
Consider the specific parameters represented in Figure 9. That is, there are two
states, a and b. In state a player 1 can produce document d1 , but in state b she can
produce no documents. Player 2 never possesses any documents. Here the production
of d1 has a cost of 10 to player 1 and a cost of 4 to player 2. That is, γ1 ({d1 }) = 10
and γ2 ({d1 }) = 4. I assume π1 = π2 = 1/2. As in Example 1, if the gain in player 1’s
transfer of disclosing d1 is less than 10, she will not produce the document in state a.
When this is the case, g1 (a) = g1 (b).
However, if m1 ({d1 }) − m1 (∅) ≥ 10, player 1 would actually disclose d1 if the
evidence production stage were reached. Recall that
g1 (a) = m1 ({d1 }) − γ1 ({d1 }) + π1 [γ1 ({d1 }) + γ2 ({d1 })],
or

1
g1 (a) = m1 ({d1 }) − 10 + [14] = m1 ({d1 }) − 3.
2
Rearranging implies g1 (a) + 3 = m1 ({d1 }). Since there is no cost of withholding a
document, it must be that g1 (b) = m1 (∅). Substituting these two expressions into
m1 ({d1 }) − 10 ≥ m1 (∅) yields g1 (a) ≥ g1 (b) + 7. Thus, any value function g such that
g1 (a) ≥ g1 (b) + 7 can be implemented. Here the additional cost to player 2 increases
the gap between g1 (a) and g1 (b). Note that Corollary 1 applies here as well. For β
such that β(a) = {d1 }, substitution yields g1 (a) − 7 ≥ g1 (b).
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Figure 9: Example – two sided evidence cost.

C

No Settlement

My analysis has assumed that players can freely renegotiate in period 3. In reality,
not all disputes are resolved prior to litigation.32 It is likely that litigants in these
disputes make some attempt to settle, but are unable to do so. In some contractual
relationships, parties may know that if they have a dispute then they will end up in
court. I take a some what simplistic approach here, and assume that parties who will
be unable to reach a settlement know this is in period 1.33 For these types of players,
this reduces to studying the case where renegotiation in period 3 is not possible.
When renegotiation in period 3 is not possible the non-settlement value function
P
is given by gi (a) = mi (β(a)) − γi (β(a)). I continue to require that i=1,2 mi =
P
0.34 However, this does not generally imply that i=1,2 gi (a) = 0. It implies that
P
i=1,2 gi (a) = −[γ1 (β(a)) + γ2 (β(a))]. Given β, I define the upper bound on mi (E)
as


min gi (a) + γi (E) if Λi (β, E) 6= ∅
.
z̃i (E; β, g) ≡ a∈Λi (β,E)
 ∞
if Λi (β, E) = ∅
I characterize the value functions that can be implemented given β as follows.
Theorem 4 (Characterization) Take as given a disclosure rule β and a (nonsettlement) value function g. There exists an externally enforced contract m such
that (i) g is implemented by β and m, and (ii) β is an equilibrium disclosure rule, if
and only if
X
z̃i (E; β, g) ≥ 0, for every E ∈ D.
i=1,2

Proof: (Necessity) Suppose β is an equilibrium disclosure rule, but
X

z̃i (E; β, g) < 0, for some E ∈ D.

i=1,2
32
Further, renegotiation, when possibly, may be costly. See Brennan and Watson (2001), and
Schwartz and Watson (2001) for thorough discussions of these ideas.
33
A more complete way to model this would be to assume that with some positive probability
renegotiation in period 3 breaks down or is not possible.
34
Recall that this is due to the potential for renegotiation between periods 4 and 5, or the rules
of the court.
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Equilibrium disclosure requires mi (β(a)) − γi (β(a)) ≥ mi (Ei ∪ βj (a)) − γi (Ei ∪
P
βj (a)), for i = 1, 2, for any Ei ⊂ Di (a), for all a ∈ A. But if i=1,2 z̃i (E; β, g) <
P
0, for some E ∈ D, then (since gi (a) = mi (β(a)) − γi (βi (a)) and i=1,2 mi = 0) for
some a, β is not an equilibrium disclosure.
P
(Sufficiency) Take any E ∈ D. That i=1,2 z̃i (E; β, g) ≥ 0, for every E ∈ D
implies the existence of an enforced contract m : D → R20 such that gi (a) − γ1 (β(a)) +
γi (E) ≥ mi (E) for all a ∈ Λi (β, E), for every E ∈ D, and each i = 1, 2. This implies
mi (β(a)) − γi (β(a)) ≥ mi (Ei ∪ βj (a)) − γi (Ei ∪ βj (a)) for any Ei ⊂ Di (a), for all
a ∈ A, and for each i = 1, 2. Q.E.D.
The intuition here is much like that of Theorem 1. Given β, the upper bound on
P
mi (E) is given by z̃i (E; β, g). When i z̃i (E; β, g) ≥ 0 for a given E, it means that
a transfer at E can be specified so that β is an equilibrium disclosure rule and g is
implemented.
The important distinction of the setting where settlement cannot occur is that the
gap of the renegotiated case is not present. This is because players actually receive
their payoffs from the evidence production game. However, this implies a new type
of gap since (non-settlement) value functions are generally not balanced. Thus, it
is possible for the players to discard resources. This allows a greater range of value
functions to be implemented than in the costless setting. Of course, the usefulness of
this feature depends upon the specific evidence environment and cost structure.35
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